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As the accounting profession continues its seemingly relentless growth in providing consulting services, concerns continue to 
be expressed about the effect such activity has or may have on auditors’ independence in performing the attest function. 
These concerns were expressed during the Metcalf and Moss Congressional hearings in the mid-1970s and in the report of 
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, and have been echoed again during the hearings held by the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in the last Congress.
The Public Oversight Board, at the request of the SEC Practice Section of the AlCPA’s Division for CPA Firms, studied this 
question carefully in 1978 and 1979, held extensive hearings, and issued its report, Scope of Services by CPA Firms. This 
report concluded that there was no evidence that the rendition of consulting services had in any instance adversely affected 
the independence of any auditing firm, but, recognizing the widespread concern, urged disclosure concerning the extent of 
such services and “self-restraint and judgment before venturing into new areas of MAS.”
These counsels have been unavailing. Auditing firms have continued to proliferate in the areas in which they render consulting 
services with no apparent effort at self-restraint or moderation. Furthermore, at the urging of the profession, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission rescinded ASR 250 which required disclosure by SEC registrants of the extent of MAS fees.
The profession has taken some positive steps to ensure auditor independence when performing MAS. It has proscribed 
executive search and certain actuarial services for SEC registrants that are audit clients. The SEC Practice Section has a 
long-standing requirement regarding reporting of MAS fees and activities. The Section has also incorporated in its peer review 
program various procedures to better assure that a firm ’s MAS services do not impair independence.
As in 1979, the Board still knows of no instance in which it can be demonstrated that the provision of MAS to an audit client 
interfered with independence in performing the audit function. However, there has continued a perception that in some fashion 
the expansion of MAS poses problems.
In an effort to define the nature and extent of these perceptions, the POB undertook a survey of various groups which either 
use audited financial statements or have a high professional interest and concern with them. To assist in this effort, it employed 
the well-known and highly esteemed firm, Audits & Surveys, Inc. The summary of the results of this survey follows.
The methodology used, the nature of the groups surveyed, the questions asked, and the answers received are set forth plainly 
in the summary and need no reiteration or explanation.
Not surprisingly, like any such survey, this one will lend itself to varying interpretation. Advocates of unfettered MAS expansion 
will find in some of the data confirmation of their conviction. Proponents of greater restraint will find comfort in other parts 
of the report.
The Public Oversight Board is publishing this report without comment. It will, along with others interested in these matters, 
study this report carefully and may at a later date, respond to it and state the implications it sees in the assembled data, and 
perhaps recommend measures responsive to the report.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first comprehensive survey of the perceptions that exist among interested and involved 
groups with respect to the relationships that exist between MAS and audit services. We believe that this information will be of 
use to firms in developing policies in this important area, to regulators and legislators in considering the desirability of measures 
affecting these matters, and to companies in determining the course they should pursue.
In conclusion, we would like to thank most warmly all those who responded to requests for information and provided us with 
their thoughtful and extremely illuminating responses.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD commissioned AUDITS & SURVEYS, INC. to 
conduct a mail survey to measure nine key publics' perceptions of the 
management advisory services (MAS) issue. This report presents the 
results of that survey.
The main purpose of the study was to determine whether members of 
these groups perceive that management consulting performed by 
certified public accountants in public practice impairs their auditing 
functions if performed for the same client. To measure these 
perceptions, the questionnaire covered the following topic areas:
• Familiarity with the public accounting profession and with the 
management advisory services issue;
• Perceived impairment of objectivity for 16 specific management 
advisory services performed by CPA's;
• Attitudes toward specific issues associated with MAS and 
toward MAS overal1;
• How MAS is handled by companies.
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During September and October 1986, Audits & Surveys conducted the 
study among samples of each of the groups listed below. There were 
2,694 questionnaires mailed out. The response rate was 41 percent at 
the cut-off date.
The key publics surveyed included:
• Chief Executive Officers of the 1,000 largest American 
industrial and service corporations
• Audit Committe Chairmen of these same companies 
• Commercial Bank Loan Officers 
• Financial Analysts 
• Investment Bankers
• Attorneys
• Financial Writers
• Accounting Faculty Members
• Deans of Business Schools
A full description of how the study was conducted appears in the 
Methodological Appendix along with copies of the questionnaire and all 
mailing pieces.
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
THE RESULTS SUGGEST THAT MEMBERS OF THE KEY PUBLICS THINK THAT 
PERFORMING CERTAIN MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES CAN IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY 
AND INDEPENDENCE AND THAT CAUTION NEEDS TO BE EXERCISED WHEN CPA'S 
PERFORM ANY MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICE FOR THEIR AUDIT CLIENTS. FOR 
THE MOST PART THEY BELIEVE OTHERS HOLD THE SAME VIEW.
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For example, some three-quarters (75%) of the key public groups 
personally agree with the following statement:
"CPA's should be allowed to perform only those management 
advisory services where it is clear that audit independence and 
objectivity cannot be impaired."
And more than half (54%) believe that others agree with this 
statement. (About a quarter could not say what others believe.)
SOME TWO-IN-TEN HOLD MORE EXTREME VIEWS.
Some 12 percent agree that CPA's should be allowed to perform a full 
range of MAS because impairment is not a problem.
Another 9 percent take a harder line and agree that CPA's should not 
be allowed to perform any MAS because there is always a possibility of 
impairment.
But even those with these more extreme views are likely to feel that 
others hold a more moderate position.
While all groups hold to the moderate position, CEOs and Business 
School Deans are somewhat more liberal than others, while Financial 
Analysts, Attorneys and Financial Writers somewhat more conservative.
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MEMBERS OF KEY PUBLIC GROUPS PERCEIVE THAT SOME SERVICES ARE MORE 
LIKELY TO IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE THAN OTHERS. THESE ARE 
RELATED TO CORPORATE STRATEGY, THE BALANCE SHEET AND FINDING AND 
COMPENSATING MANAGEMENT.
About half or more of key public members think the following 
management advisory services could cause a "great deal of" or "some" 
impairment:
t Negotiating mergers, acquisitions and divestitures (76%)
• Performing actuarial services which directly affect amounts 
involved on the balance sheet (64%)
• Identifying merger and acquisition candidates (62%)
• Implementing a strategic plan (63%)
• Valuing assets acquired in a business combination (61%)
• Executive search for senior management personnel (56%)
• Renegotiations or redetermining price under a procurement 
contract (50%)
• Developing a strategic plan (49%)
• Developing an executive compensation plan (47%)
-5-
OTHER SERVICES ARE PERCEIVED AS LESS LIKELY TO IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE. THEY ARE SERVICES DIRECTED TOWARD INTERNAL COMPANY 
OPERATIONS OR LIMITED PLANNING.
In order of perception that they pose "little" or "no" chance for 
impairment, these are:
• Performing a plant site location study (75%)
• Designing a computer system (73%)
• Designing a control system for managing long-term 
contracts (65%)
• Designing and installing a computer system (66%)
• Developing a market feasibility study (66%)
• Performing actuarial services for the company's pension 
plan (64%)
• Designing and/or implementing a cash management system (63%)
REACTION TO LEVEL OF POTENTIAL IMPAIRMENT FOR SPECIFIC SERVICES DOES 
VARY SOMEWHAT BY KEY PUBLIC. CEOS AND BANK LOAN OFFICERS APPEAR LESS 
CONCERNED THAN OTHERS, WHILE ATTORNEYS AND FINANCIAL WRITERS ARE MORE 
CONCERNED.
ON OTHER ATTITUDE COMPONENTS OF THE MAS ISSUE, KEY PUBLIC OPINIONS 
AGAIN ARGUE FOR CAUTION AND A REASONED APPROACH.
MOST AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING FOUR POSITIONS.
In order of decreasing agreement they are:
The auditing firm should be required to represent to 
the audit committee or board of directors that in its 
opinion the performance of management advisory 
services did not impair audit independence and 
objectivity. (80% agree.)
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Even though performing a single management advisory 
service may not impair auditor independence and 
objectivity, performing a series of management 
advisory services in the aggregate may. (73% agree)
The larger the management advisory fees in relation to 
the auditing fees received from the same client, the 
greater the likelihood that independence and 
objectivity will be impaired. (72% agree)
All management advisory services performed by the 
auditing firm should be reported in the client's 
annual report. (68% agree)
MOST DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING TWO STATEMENTS.
If the personnel performing the management advisory 
services are not personally involved in the audit, 
then impairment of independence and objectivity is not 
an issue. (67% disagree)
CPA's who perform management advisory services are 
better able to conduct more informed audits than those 
who do not perform these additional services. (52% 
disagree)
AS WITH PREVIOUS QUESTIONS, ATTITUDES VARY SOMEWHAT BY KEY PUBLIC. 
GENERALLY, IT IS THE CEOS AND AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN WHO EXPRESS 
MORE LIBERAL ATTITUDES; WHILE ATTORNEYS, AND IN SOME CASES, FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS AND WRITERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HARDLINERS.
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A VERY LARGE PROPORTION (86%) OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN SAY THAT 
THEIR COMMITTEES REVIEW MAS FOR IMPAIRMENT AND THAT THE REVIEW MORE 
OFTEN THAN NOT OCCURS BEFORE (76%) MAS TAKES PLACE.
VERY FEW HAVE EVER TAKEN THE POSITION THAT AN AUDITING FIRM SHOULD NOT 
BE USED BECAUSE AN MAS ASSIGNMENT COULD IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY (13%) OR BE 
PERCEIVED TO IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY (7%).
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN WOULD NOT OBJECT (91%) IF MAS SERVICES 
PERFORMED HAD TO BE REPORTED IN PUBLIC.
-8-
II. READING NOTES
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II. READING NOTES
- Percentages read down when % signs are at top of columns.
- Percentages read across when % signs are in left hand columns.
- Percentages may add to more than 100% due to multiple answers.
- Sometimes when figures do not add to totals shown, differences are 
due to rounding the percentages.
- An asterisk (*) in a table means the percentage figure is less than 
one-half of one percent.
- A dash (-) in a table means there were no responses in the cell.
-10-
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III. DETAILED FINDINGS
A. FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND WITH THE MAS ISSUE
FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND THE MAS ISSUE IS HIGH. 
YET, MEMBERS OF THE KEY PUBLICS SURVEYED ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE 
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION GENERALLY THAN THEY ARE WITH THE MAS ISSUE 
ITSELF.
Over half of those who responded say they are "very familiar" with the 
profession. Another four-in-ten say they are "somewhat familiar."
Less say they are as familiar with the MAS issue. About one-quarter 
claim they are "very familiar" and about 45 percent "somewhat 
familiar."
THE RESULTS SUGGEST THAT SOME KEY PUBLIC GROUPS KNOW MORE THAN 
OTHERS. CEOS, AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, ACCOUNTING PROFESSORS AND 
BUSINESS SCHOOL DEANS APPEAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ON BOTH COUNTS.
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B KEY PUBLICS' OVERALL VIEW ON THE MAS ISSUE
MEMBERS OF EACH OF THE KEY PUBLIC GROUPS EXPRESS A MODERATE OVERALL 
VIEW OF THE MAS IMPAIRMENT ISSUE.
SOME THREE-QUARTERS AGREED WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
"CPAs should be allowed to perform only those management advisory 
services where it is clear that audit independence and objectivity 
cannot be impaired."
GENERALLY, MORE EXTREME POSITIONS ARE NOT HELD BY MANY.
About one-in-ten say that:
"CPAs should not be allowed to perform any management advisory 
services since there is always a possibility that audit 
independence and objectivity may be impaired."
As many take the opposite position and say that the following
statement comes closest to expressing their views about MAS:
"CPAs should be allowed to perform a full range of management 
advisory services because impairment of audit independence and 
objectivity is not a problem."
WHILE ALL GROUPS HOLD A MODERATE POSITION GENERALLY, CEOS AND BUSINESS 
SCHOOL DEANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO SAY THAT "AUDIT INDEPENDENCE AND 
OBJECTIVITY IS NOT A PROBLEM."
ON THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS, ATTORNEYS AND 
FINANCIAL WRITERS ARE SLIGHTLY MORE LIKELY TO BELIEVE THAT "THERE IS 
ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY THAT AUDIT INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY MAY BE 
IMPAIRED."
-14-
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OVERALL, LEVEL OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION OR WITH THE 
MAS ISSUE APPEARS TO BE UNRELATED TO KEY PUBLICS' PERCEPTIONS. EVEN AMONG 
THOSE WHO SAY THEY ARE "A LITTLE" OR "NOT AT ALL FAMILIAR" WITH THE 
PROFESSION OR MAS, THREE-QUARTERS AGREE WITH THE MODERATE VIEW.
It should be pointed out however, that CEOs and Business School Deans are 
among the groups that claim they know more about the profession and MAS.
At the same time, they are slightly more likely to say independence and 
objectivity are not problems.
Looking at the data by key public group suggests that there might be a 
small association between knowledge and perception, but it is not very 
strong nor definitive.
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TABLE 3
Q.6 Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing 
your views about management advisory services?
FAMILIARITY WITH
PROFESSION* MAS*
TOTAL
VERY/
SOMEWHAT
LITTLE/
NONE
VERY
SOMEWHAT
LITTLE/
NONE
(1059) (991) (65) (728) (309)
CPAs should be allowed to 
perform a full range of 
management advisory services 
because impairment of audit 
independence and objectivity 
is not a problem 12% 13% 3% 14% 6%
CPAs should be allowed to 
perform only those management 
advisory services where it is 
clear that audit independence 
and objectivity cannot be 
impaired 75 74 76 74 78
CPAs should not be allowed 
to perform any management 
advisory services since there 
is always a possibility that 
audit independence and 
objectivity may be impaired 10 10 9 10 8
No opinion/don't know 4 4 12 2 9
* Excludes those who say they "don't know" how familiar they are with 
either the accounting profession or the MAS issue and those who did not 
answer either familiarity question.
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TABLE 4
LEVEL O F FAMILIARITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF MAS ISSUE
Audit Committee Chairmen 
Accounting Professors 
CEOS
Business School Deans 
Attorneys 
Bank Loan Officers 
Investment Bankers 
Financial Analysts 
Financial Writers
"VERY FAMILIAR WITH"
ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION MAS
69% 48%
67 36
66 32
59 32
53 19
47 8
46 13
41 22
39 15
OVERALL PERCEPTION OF 
MAS ISSUE
FULL
RANGE DEPENDS NONE
15% 82 3
10% 78 8
22% 67 6
22% 64 14
6% 76 13
11% 81 3
11% 72 9
4% 74 17
6% 76 12
-19
C. KEY PUBLICS' PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER'S VIEWS ON THE MAS ISSUE
MEMBERS OF EACH OF THE KEY PUBLIC GROUPS PERCEIVE OTHERS' VIEWS OF THE 
MAS ISSUE AS BEING MODERATE LIKE THEIR OWN. EVEN THOSE WITH MORE 
EXTREME VIEWS, THINK OTHERS ARE MORE MODERATE IN THEIR VIEWS THAN THEY 
ARE. MANY, OF COURSE, ALSO SAY THEY DO NOT KNOW HOW OTHERS FEEL ABOUT 
THE ISSUE.
For example, a little more than half say that others would take the 
position that CPA's should perform only those services where it is 
clear objectivity cannot be impaired. About one-in-ten each would 
argue that others are more extreme one way or the other. A full 
quarter say they cannot give an answer as to how others feel about the 
issue because they just don't know.
Even among those who are more liberal in their own views and believe 
that CPA's need not worry, more than half feel others' views are more 
moderate. Likewise, among those who take a hard line and say there is 
always a possibility of impairment, they perceive others to hold the 
more moderate middle position.
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D. EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC MAS SERVICES ON POSSIBILITY OF IMPAIRMENT
Since most say that their views and those of others on the impairment 
issue depend on which service is performed, evaluation of specific 
services can provide some insight into perceptions. Key public members 
were asked to consider a list of 16 MAS services that CPA's perform and 
rate each one on how much or little it impairs audit independence and 
objectivity when performed. Some services are clearly perceived as 
more of a problem than others.
HALF OR MORE OF THE KEY PUBLIC MEMBERS SAY THEY THINK THAT NINE 
SERVICES MAY POSE IMPAIRMENT PROBLEMS WHEN PERFORMED ALONG WITH 
AUDITING. ALL SERVICES APPEAR TO BE RELATED TO CORPORATE STRATEGY, 
BALANCE SHEET, OR FINDING AND COMPENSATING MANAGEMENT.
SERVICES NOT PERCEIVED TO BE A PROBLEM INCLUDE THOSE CONCERNED WITH 
INTERNAL COMPANY MATTERS OR LIMITED PLANNING.
One stood out head and shoulders above the rest as most troublesome -- 
Negotiating Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures." Some three- 
quarters say that performing this service may impair independence 
either "a great deal" or "somewhat." At the other end of the scale 
about three-quarters say that Designing A Computer System," or 
"Performing A Plant Site Location Study" would "very little" or "not at 
all" impair independence and objectivity.
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REACTION TO LEVEL OF POTENTIAL IMPAIRMENT FOR EACH SERVICE DOES VARY 
SOMEWHAT BY KEY PUBLIC. CEO'S AND BANK LOAN OFFICERS APPEAR LESS CONCERNED 
THAN OTHERS, WHILE ATTORNEYS AND FINANCIAL WRITERS ARE MORE CONCERNED.
On almost every service listed where half or more of the respondents felt 
that audit objectivity and/or independence might be impaired, a smaller 
proportion of CEO's, compared to everyone else, see objectivity and 
independence at risk. CEO's are least concerned with developing executive 
compensation plans, searching for senior management or identifying merger 
and acquisition candidates. Except for one service, Bank Loan Officers 
also are slightly less concerned than others.
Attorneys and Financial Writers, however, appear to be more concerned on 
every issue than the key public as a whole. In each of these groups the 
primary concern appears to be identifying or negotiating mergers and 
acquisitions and valuing assets acquired in a business combination.
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E. ATTITUDES TOWARD COMPONENTS OF THE MAS ISSUE
The issue of whether providing MAS services impairs audit independence 
and objectivity is associated with a number of related attitudes and 
opinions. Study participants were asked to indicate how strongly they 
agreed or disagreed with six of these attitudes and opinions often 
heard in discussions or seen in articles about the MAS issue. The 
responses suggest that key public opinion is cautious and reasoned.
MOST KEY PUBLIC MEMBERS AGREE THAT AN "AUDITING FIRM SHOULD BE REQUIRED 
TO REPRESENT TO THE AUDIT COMMITTEE OR BOARD OF DIRECTORS THAT 
PERFORMANCE OF MAS DID NOT IMPAIR AUDIT INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY."
Some 80 percent either "strongly agree" or "agree" with this view, and 
this opinion is shared by members of each key public group, especially 
among Audit Committee Chairmen (91%).
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TABLE 8
Q.5 The following is a series of statements people have made about the 
issues surrounding CPA's performing management advisory services. 
For each one, please indicate whether you agree or disagree by 
checking the appropriate box.
Even though performing a 
single management advisory 
service may not impair 
auditor independence and 
objectivity, performing a 
series of management 
advisory services in the 
aggregate may..............
If the personnel performing 
the management advisory 
services are not personally 
involved in the audit, then 
impairment of independence 
and objectivity is not an 
issue.......................
The larger the management 
advisory fees in relation to 
the auditing fees received 
from the same client, the 
greater the likelihood 
that independence and objec­
tivity will be impaired....
The auditing firm should 
be required to represent 
to the audit committee 
or board of directors that 
in its opinion the perfor­
mance of management advisory 
services did not impair 
audit independence and 
objectivity.................
All management advisory 
services performed by the 
auditing firm should be 
reported in the client's 
annual report.............
CPA's who perform manage­
ment advisory services are 
better able to conduct 
more informed audits than 
those who do not perform 
these additional services..
Strongly Strongly No Opinion/
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't Know
14% 59 19 3 6
3% 26 54 13 5
21% 51 20 3 5
36% 44 9 3 9
26% 42 21 5 5
4% 34 40 12 9
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THERE IS ALSO WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT WITH THE STATEMENT THAT "THE LARGER
THE MAS FEE IN RELATION TO AUDITING FEES RECEIVED FROM THE SAME CLIENT 
THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD THAT INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY WILL BE 
IMPAIRED."
About seven-in-ten say this. But there is some variability among the 
groups. For example, CEO's are somewhat less likely to agree (59%), 
while the financial analysts (83%) and attorneys (81%) are more likely
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ABOUT TWO-THIRDS AGREE THAT "ALL MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES PERFORMED BY
THE AUDITING FIRM SHOULD BE REPORTED IN THE CLIENTS ANNUAL REPORT."
But again veiws differ by key public groups. A larger proportion of CEOs 
actually disagree with this position, while Audit Committee Chairmen are 
almost evenly split. On the other hand Bank Loan Officers and Financial 
Writers, perhaps concerned with disclosure and access to information argue 
more strongly for this point-of-view.
THERE IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE STATEMENT "EVEN THOUGH 
PERFORMING A SINGLE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICE MAY NOT IMPAIR AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY, PERFORMING A SERIES OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY 
SERVICES IN THE AGGREGATE MAY."
Some 59 percent "agree" while 14 percent "strongly agree". While CEO’s and 
Audit Committee Chairmen in the main concur with the overall view, about a 
third of each group register some disagreement.
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THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT EXPRESSED WITH TWO STATEMENTS. TWO-THIRDS OF THE 
KEY PUBLIC MEMBERS DISAGREED WITH "IF THE PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE MAS ARE 
NOT PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE AUDIT, THEN IMPAIRMENT OF INDEPENDENCE AND 
OBJECTIVITY IS NOT AN ISSUE."
Again, CEO's buck the trend and are less likely to disagree with this 
statement, as are Audit Committee Chairmen and Deans. On the other hand, 
Attorneys seem least of all convinced that if the personnel are different 
then impairment is not an issue.
THERE IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE NOTION THAT CPA'S MAKE 
BETTER AUDITORS IF THEY CONDUCT MAS. SIX-IN-TEN DISAGREED WITH THIS 
STATEMENT "CPA'S WHO PERFORM MAS ARE BETTER ABLE TO CONDUCT MORE INFORMED 
AUDITS THAN THOSE WHO DO NOT PERFORM THESE ADDITIONAL SERVICES."
Perhaps not surprisingly, Accounting Professors and Business School Deans 
are more likely to express the opposite view than the others.
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F. AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN'S EXPERIENCES WITH MAS
To obtain a measure of if, when and to what end audit committees review 
MAS services, a series of questions were included specifically for 
Audit Committee Chairmen.
A VERY LARGE PROPORTION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN SAY THAT THEIR 
COMMITTEES REVIEW MAS FOR IMPAIRMENT AND THAT THE REVIEW MORE OFTEN 
THAN NOT OCCURS BEFORE MAS TAKES PLACE. VERY FEW HAVE EVER TAKEN THE 
POSITION THAT AN AUDITING FIRM COULD NOT BE USED BECAUSE AN MAS 
ASSIGNMENT COULD IMPAIR OBJECTIVITY.
ALSO, AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN WOULD NOT BE BOTHERED IF MAS SERVICES 
PERFORMED HAD TO BE PUBLICLY REPORTED.
THE DATA SUGGEST AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN USE CPA FIRMS TO DO BOTH MAS 
AND AUDITING MORE OFTEN THAN SELECTING A NEW CPA FIRM TO DO MAS. BUT 
AUDIT CHAIRMEN SAY THEY ALSO USE NON-CPA MANAGEMENT CONSULTING FIRMS TO 
DO MAS TYPE WORK.
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TABLE 15
Q.9a Does your audit committee review 
management advisory services engage­
ments performed by your auditing 
firm to determine if audit indepen­
dence and objectivity could be 
impaired?
Is such a review conducted before 
or after the auditing firm performs 
management advisory services for 
your company?
Has your committee ever taken the 
position that your auditing firm 
should not be used for a specific 
MAS assignment because it could 
impair the firm's independence or 
could be perceived as impairing 
independence?
If all management advisory services 
performed by your company's auditing 
firm would have to be publicly 
reported, would you recommend that 
management not use the firm for 
management advisory services?
YES 86%
NO
DON'T KNOW/
12
NO ANSWER 3
Q.9b BEFORE 76%
AFTER
DON'T KNOW/
42
NO ANSWER 2
Q.9c YES, COULD IMPAIR 
YES, PERCEIVED TO
13%
IMPAIR 7
NO 80
Q.9d YES 6%
NO
DON'T KNOW/
91
NO ANSWER 3
Q.10 During the past three years, how many times has your company used 
the management advisory services of the following kinds of 
providers?
a.
b.
c.
NONE
LESS THAN 
5 TIMES
5 TIMES 
OR MORE
DON'T
KNOW
CPA firm that performs the 
annual audit................ . 1% 57 38 4
Other CPA firm................ .28% 36 7 29
Non-CPA management consulting 
firm........................ 38 32 26
NOTE: THESE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED BY BETWEEN 69 AND 45 AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN.
* ADDS TO MORE THAN 100% BECAUSE SOME SAID REVIEW CONDUCTED BEFORE AND 
AFTER.
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IV. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
o Population and Sample
The population for the study was defined by the Public Oversight 
Board as member of nine key publics. These are listed below along 
with the sources used to define the sampling frame.
Key Public Group Source List_______
o CEO's Fortune 1000 Industrial and 
Service Companies -- Research 
Project Corp.
o Audit Committee Chairmen Fortune 1000 Industrial and
Service Companies —  Directorship 
Magazine
o Bank Loan Officers Robert Morris Associates
o Financial Analysts Financial Analysts Federation, 
1986 Membership Directory
o Investment Bankers Securities Industry Association, 
1986 Directory and Guide
o Attorneys American Bar Association, 
1984-1985 Committee Directory
o Financial Writers Public Oversight Board, American 
Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants
o Accounting Faculty Accounting Faculty Directory, 1986 
-- James R. Hasselback
o Business School Deans American Assembly of Collegiate 
Schools of Business, Membership 
Directory, 1985-1986
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A random skip interval sample was taken from each of these listings. 
In the case of CEOs and Audit Committee Chairmen, the Fortune 1000 
list was randomly divided in half, and then CEOs drawn from one half 
and Chairmen from the other so that these two groups would not 
overlap.
NUMBER UNDELIVER­
ABLES
NUMBER RESPONSE
KEY PUBLIC GROUP MAILED RETURNED RATE
CEO 375 13 125 35%
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 359 31 136 42
BANK LOAN OFFICER 339 2 170 50
FINANCIAL ANALYST 375 10 125 34
INVESTMENT BANKER 365 35 94 29
ATTORNEY 372 21 143 41
FINANCIAL WRITER 146 9 33 24
ACCOUNTING PROFESSOR 182 3 122 68
BUSINESS SCHOOL DEAN 181 2 111 62
TOTAL 2,694 126 1,059 41
After the cut-off date another 12 questionnaires were returned, and 6 
more undeliverables, raising the final return rate to 42 percent. The 
additional returns were not used in the analysis.
o Questionnaire and Mailings
The questionnaire was designed by Audits & Surveys based on a draft 
supplied by the Public Oversight Board. An advance letter alerting 
sample members was sent out on Public Oversight Board stationery. 
Two mailings of the questionnaire each carried a covering letter on 
Audits & Surveys stationery. Several versions of the letters were 
prepared to accommodate various endorsements.
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A total of 2,694 names were drawn as shown below. By the cut-off date 
we received back 1,059 responses for a response rate of 41 percent.
All questionnaire mailings included a self-addressed stamped return 
envelope. Additionally, a postcard was included for completion if 
a respondent wished a copy of the results.
Copies of all mailing materials appear following this Appendix.
The mailing schedule appears below:
Data Processing
All questionnaires were edited by Audits & Surveys' Coding 
Department. Questionnaires were keypunched and 20 percent key 
verified. The tabulation consisted of a banner which included the 
following:
Total (weighted)
Key Publics (from mailing list) 
CEOs
Audit Committee Chairmen 
Bank Loan Officers 
Financial Analysts 
Investment Bankers 
Attorneys 
Financial Writers 
Accounting Faculty Professors 
Deans of Business Schools
Familiarity with:
Accounting Profession (Q.2a) 
Very/Somewhat 
Little/Not at All 
MAS Issue (Q.2b)
Very/Somewhat 
Little/Not at All
Advance Letter 
First Wave Questionnaire 
Second Wave Questionnaire 
Cut-Off Date
September 5 - September 11 
September 15 - September 19 
October 3 - October 7 
October 29
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Overall Attitude Toward MAS Issue (Q.6) 
Full Range 
Depends 
Not at All
The "total" column represents weighted percentages. These were 
arrived at by weighting each one of the key publics equally when 
calculating total column percentages, rather than having the total 
column reflect the uneven sample sizes for each group.
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V. VERBATIMS
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A sample of some of the comments written on the questionnaire by the 
respondents.
Q.8 Do you have any other comments about the management advisory 
services issues?
o The AICPA should indicate areas from which CPA firms should be 
excluded in MAS consultation.
o The validity of an audit may be impaired when the results are an 
indicator of the success of a plan developed by the auditor.
o I believe that CPA firms do offer very competent management advisory 
services; but at the same time, I also believe that they should not 
provide those services to firms whom they audit.
o It should be advisory only. Not operational.
o People's perception of independence important issue whether or not 
true impairment exists.
o Such services if performed by the company's auditor should be 
reported in the Proxy Statement.
o I don't think payments to an auditing firm are intrinsically more 
"corrupting" for MAS than for the audit itself.
o I think it's a non-issue.
o I do not believe that a client's occasional use of their CPA's MAS 
impairs audit independence and objectivity even if in a given year 
the MAS fees paid by the client constitute a high proportion of the 
clients total fees paid the CPA. To me the important relationship 
is that of the client's total fees paid the CPA to the CPA's total 
feels from all clients for all services, i.e. the importance of the 
account to the financial well-being of the CPA.
o While I do not believe the area is a serious problem, I think 
safeguards can be implemented both within CPA firms and within 
public companies which employ them to assure that independence is 
not compromised by MAS services.
o I feel strongly that the total amount of MAS should not be allowed 
to become important relative to the audit assignment.
o While this questionnaire is valuable, one cannot always generalize 
in assessing the impairment of audit judgment resulting from 
management advisory services since much depends on specific 
circumstances.
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o Potential for conflict of interest is very large; should separate as 
the investment community has separated stock/broad recommendations 
and investment banking.
o Public perception of independence can be maintained only by applying 
stringent rules. CPA's should be allowed to provide any management 
services, but not for their audit clients. Two or more CPA firms 
will be needed to service one client.
o The U.S. CPA enjoys a special position due to S.E.C. Rules and 
Regulations. Leave most of the management consulting to 
professionals in that field.
o Independence is more directly related to the magnitude of fees paid 
relative to the size of the audit firm as opposed to the type if 
management advisory services performed.
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Copies of the full report including field materials and 
computer tabulations are available at $25.00 per copy 
plus $3.00 postage and handling from Audits & Surveys, 
Inc., One Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016.
Public O versight Board
540 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
(212) 486-2448
